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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper introduces the concept of trusted computing, and 
highlights the ways in which it may be leveraged to enable 
the provision of high assurance Software Defined Radio 
(SDR) platforms. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A software defined radio is a communications device 
“whose operational modes and parameters can be changed 
or augmented, post manufacturing via software” [1]. This 
implies that the device can be reconfigured to communicate 
using multiple frequency bands and protocols, or upgraded 
in a low cost and efficient manner. While the concept of a 
reconfigurable air interface holds considerable promise, 
SDR will only be accepted if the security threats pertaining 
to the secure download and execution of reconfiguration 
software can be addressed.  
In this paper the concept of trusted computing is 
initially explored. An overview of the trusted computing 
industry standard specifications is presented, in conjunction 
with a synopsis of the most recent developments in trusted 
computing technologies. Following this, we highlight the 
threats which may impact upon an SDR device, and analyze 
those threats which may be addressed through the 
deployment of trusted computing functionality. 
 
2. TRUSTED COMPUTING 
 
In the context of trusted computing, a platform is trusted if it 
“behaves in an expected manner for an intended purpose” 
[2]. This does not necessarily imply, however, that a Trusted 
Platform (TP) is a secure platform. For example, if an entity 
can determine that a platform is infected with a virus, whose 
effects are known, the platform can be trusted by that entity 
to behave in an expected but malicious manner [3]. 
 In order to implement a platform of this nature, a trusted 
component, which is usually in the form of built-in 
hardware, is integrated into a computing platform [4]. This 
trusted component is then used to create a foundation of 
trust for software processes running on the platform [4]. 
 It is said that “trusted platforms were so-called because 
they provide a technological implementation and 
interpretation of the factors that permit us, in everyday life, 
to trust others” [5], i.e. 
• Either first hand experience of consistent behavior, 
or trust in someone who vouches for consistent 
behavior; 
• Unambiguous identification; and 
• Unhindered operation. 
 We examine this statement in relation to the ‘trusted 
component’ upon which a trusted platform is constructed, 
and the software processes running on the platform, for 
which it provides a ‘foundation of trust’. 
 
3. THE TRUSTED COMPUTING GROUP 
 
The Trusted Computing Group (TCG)1 is an industry forum 
which is developing standards for trusted computing 
platforms. Trusted computing, as currently defined by the 
TCG, is built upon four fundamental concepts: integrity 
measurement, authenticated boot, platform attestation, and 
sealing. 
 
3.1. Integrity Measurement 
 
An integrity measurement is defined in [6] as the 
cryptographic digest or hash of a platform component. For 
example, an integrity measurement of a program can be 
calculated by computing the cryptographic digest or hash of 
its instruction sequence, its initial state (i.e. the executable 
file) and its input. 
 
3.2. Authenticated Boot 
 
An authenticated boot process represents the process by 
which a platform’s configuration or state is reliably 
measured, and the resulting measurement is reliably stored. 
During this process, the integrity of a pre-defined set of 
platform components is measured, as defined in section 3.1, 
in a particular order. These measurements are condensed to 
form a set of integrity metrics which can then be stored in a 
tamper-resistant log. Condensing enables an unbounded 
number of platform component measurements to be stored. 
If each measurement was stored separately it would be 
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difficult to decide on an upper bound on the size of memory 
required to store them [4]. A record of the platform 
components which have been measured is also stored on the 
platform. 
 
3.3. Attestation 
 
Attestation is the process by which a platform can reliably 
report evidence of its identity and its current state (i.e. the 
integrity metrics which have been stored to the tamper 
resistant log, and the record of the platform components 
which have been measured, as described in section 3.2). 
 
3.4. Sealing 
 
Sealing represents the process of associating data with a set 
of integrity metrics representing a particular platform 
configuration, and encrypting it. The data can only be 
decrypted and released when the state of platform is the 
same as that indicated by the integrity metrics sealed with 
the data. 
 
4. THE TRUSTED PLATFORM SUBSYSTEM 
 
As described in section 2, in order to provide the services 
described above, a ‘trusted component’ must be integrated 
into a platform. This trusted component is comprised of 
three so-called ‘roots of trust’ – the Root of Trust for 
Measurement (RTM), the Root of Trust for Storage (RTS), 
and the Root of Trust for Reporting (RTR). A root of trust is 
defined as a component that must be unconditionally trusted 
for the platform to be trusted [2]. 
 
4.1. The RTM 
 
The RTM is an engine capable of measuring at least one 
platform component, and hence providing an integrity 
measurement, as described in section 3.1. The RTM is 
typically implemented as the normal platform engine 
controlled by a particular instruction set (the so-called ‘Core 
Root of Trust for Measurement’ (CRTM)). On a PC, the 
CRTM may be contained within the BIOS or the BIOS Boot 
Block (BBB), and is executed by the platform when it is 
acting as the RTM. It is required by the TCG that the CRTM 
is protected against software attack: the CRTM must be 
immutable, as defined by the TCG, meaning that its 
replacement or modification must be under the control of the 
host platform manufacturer alone [7]. It is also preferably 
that the CRTM be physically tamper-evident [4]. 
 
4.2. The RTS and RTR 
 
The RTS is a collection of capabilities which must be trusted 
if storage of data inside a platform is to be trusted [4]. The 
RTS is capable of maintaining an accurate summary of 
integrity measurements made by the RTM, i.e. condensing 
integrity measurements and storing the resulting integrity 
metrics, as described in section 3.2. The RTS also provides 
integrity and confidentiality protection to data and enables 
sealing. In conjunction with the RTM and RTS, an 
additional root of trust is necessary for the implementation 
of platform attestation, namely the RTR. The RTR is a 
collection of capabilities that must be trusted if reports of 
integrity metrics are to be trusted (platform attestation) [4]. 
The RTR and the RTS constitute the minimum 
functionality that should be provided by a Trusted Platform 
Module (TPM) [9-11]. A TPM is generally implemented as 
a chip which must be uniquely bound to a platform.  In order 
to support RTS and RTR functionality, a TPM incorporates 
various functional components such as: I/O; non-volatile and 
volatile memory; a minimum of 16 Platform Configuration 
Registers (PCRs), which are used by the RTS to store the 
platform's integrity metrics; a random number generator; a 
hash engine; key generation capabilities; an asymmetric 
encryption and digital signature engine; and an execution 
engine. The TPM must be protected completely against 
software attack, i.e. the RTS and RTR (i.e. the TPM) must 
be immutable, which implies that the replacement or 
modification of RTS and RTR code must be under the 
control of the TPM manufacturer alone. The TPM is 
required to provide a limited degree of protection against 
physical attack (tamper-evidence) [4]. 
 
5. TP SUBSYSTEM FUNCTIONALITY 
 
We now examine how the services described in section 3 are 
provided by the RTM, RTS and RTR. 
 
5.1. The Authenticated Boot Process 
 
An authenticated boot process enables the state of a platform 
to be measured and recorded so that it can be reported to a 
challenger of the platform, as described in section 3.3. A 
simplified authenticated boot process may proceed as 
follows, where we assume that the CRTM is part of the 
BBB. The CRTM measures itself and the rest of the BIOS 
(i.e. the POST BIOS). The computed measurements are then 
passed to the RTS which condenses them and stores the 
resulting integrity metric to the first of the 16 PCRs (PCR-
0). Control is then passed to the POST BIOS which 
measures the host platform configuration, the option ROM 
code and configuration, and the Operating System (OS) 
loader. The computed measurements are passed to the RTS, 
which condenses them and stores the resulting integrity 
metrics to PCRs 1-5. Control is then passed to the OS loader 
which measures the OS. This process of measuring, 
condensing, storing, and handing-off, continues until the 
platform’s configuration has been measured and stored. The 
exact measurement process is dependent on the platform; for 
example, the TCG specifications detail authenticated boot 
processes for a platform which has a 32-bit PC architecture 
BIOS, [7] and for an Extensible Firmware Interface platform 
[8]. 
 
5.2. The TPM Protected Storage Functionality 
 
The TPM protected storage functionality, which 
incorporates its sealing capability, was designed so that an 
unbounded number of secrets/data could be confidentiality 
and integrity protected on a TP. Asymmetric cryptography is 
used to confidentiality-protect data. 
Protected storage also provides implicit integrity 
protection of data objects. Data can be associated with a 
string of 20 bytes of authorization data before it is 
encrypted. If data decryption is requested, the authorization 
data must be submitted to the TPM. The submitted data is 
compared to the authorization data in the decrypted string, 
and the decrypted data object is only released if the values 
match. If the encrypted object has been tampered with, after 
decryption the authorization data will most likely have been 
corrupted (because of the method of encryption employed) 
and access will not be granted even to an entity which has 
submitted the correct authorization data. Functionality to 
control how data is used on its release, or to protect data 
from deletion, is not provided. 
The TPM protected storage functionality incorporates 
an asymmetric key generation capability. This capability 
enables the generation of key pairs, where the private keys 
from these pairs can only be used on the TPM on which they 
were generated, and/or can only be used if the TPM host 
platform is in a specified state. These private keys are never 
exposed outside the TPM in the clear. The TPM enables the 
encryption of keys or data external to the TPM so that they 
can only be decrypted on a particular TPM; it also enables 
the encryption of keys or data external to the TPM so that 
they can only be decrypted by a particular TPM when the 
TPM host platform is in a particular state. Finally, sealing is 
provided, i.e. the association of data with a particular 
platform configuration (i.e. a set of integrity metrics) and its 
encryption by a particular TPM. The sealed data can only be 
decrypted by the same TPM and will only be released if the 
TPM host platform is in the specified state. 
 
5.2. Platform Attestation 
 
Platform attestation enables a TPM to reliably report 
information about its identity and the current state of the 
TPM host platform. Each TPM is associated with a unique 
asymmetric key pair called an endorsement key pair, and a 
set of credentials. A trusted platform management entity 
(which is generally the TPM manufacturer) attests to the fact 
that the TPM is indeed genuine by digitally signing an 
endorsement credential, which binds the public endorsement 
key to a TPM description. Conformance credentials may be 
issued by laboratories: these attest that a particular type of 
TPM, associated components such as a CRTM, the 
connection of a CRTM to a motherboard, and the 
connection of a TPM to a motherboard, conform to TCG 
specifications. A platform entity (usually the platform 
manufacturer) offers assurance in the form of a platform 
credential that a particular platform is an instantiation of a 
TP. In order to create a platform credential, a platform entity 
must examine the endorsement credential of the TPM, the 
conformance credentials relevant to the TP, and the platform 
to be certified. 
Since a TPM can be uniquely identified by its 
endorsement key pair, this key pair is not routinely used by a 
platform, ensuring that the activities of a TP cannot be 
tracked. Instead, an arbitrary number of pseudonyms in the 
form of attestation identity key (AIK) pairs can be generated 
by a TPM and associated with a TP. Privacy-Certification 
Authorities (P-CAs) enable attestation identity public keys 
to be associated with TPs through the generation of AIK 
credentials. Once a platform has requested an AIK 
credential from a specified P-CA, the P-CA verifies all the 
TP credentials, as described above, to ensure that the TP is 
genuine, and then creates (signs) an AIK credential which 
binds the public AIK to a generic description of the TP. The 
private AIK is used by the TPM during platform attestation. 
Platform attestation is a process by which a platform 
signs a nonce (sent by a challenger of the platform) in 
conjunction with integrity metrics reflecting the current state 
of the platform, using one of its private AIKs. This signed 
bundle is returned to the challenger with the record of the 
platform components which are reflected in the integrity 
metrics, together with the appropriate AIK credential. The 
challenger then uses this information to determine whether it 
is: 
1. Safe to trust the TP from which the statement has 
originated; 
2. Safe to trust (part of) the software environment 
running on the platform. 
 
6. TRUST 
 
We now evaluate the factors which make it safe to trust a TP 
and (part of) the software environment running on the 
platform. It is safe for the challenger to trust a TP on 
validation of two elements. 
• An AIK credential, in which a trusted entity 
vouches for the consistent behavior of the TP, i.e. 
that the CRTM and TPM comply with TCG 
specifications. If the CRTM and TPM comply with 
the TCG specifications, this also implies that both 
the CRTM and TPM are immutable and tamper-
evident and can therefore be trusted to operate 
unhindered. 
• The signature of the TPM generated using its 
private AIK, which serves to unambiguously 
identify a TP. 
It is only safe to trust (part of) the software environment of 
the platform which has been attested to after examining two 
elements. 
• The signed integrity metrics reported by the TP, 
which enable the challenger to verify (part of) the 
platform’s software environment. 
• The expected integrity measurements of each 
platform component, which can be extracted from 
the component’s validation certificate. A validation 
certificate gives the expected integrity measurement 
of a component if it is behaving as intended. These 
measurements are then condensed and compared to 
the integrity metrics attested to by the TP and 
received by the challenger. The reported identity of 
(part of) the TP’s software environment can thence 
be validated. After validation, (part of) the TP’s 
software environment can be unambiguously 
identified. 
In order to ensure software can operate unhindered, the 
definition of what constitutes trusted computing 
functionality, as defined by the TCG, must be revised and 
extended to incorporate concepts such as software isolation 
or protected software execution. 
 
7. ISOLATED EXECUTION ENVIRONMENTS 
 
Isolation enables the unhindered execution of software [5]. 
In addition to the services provided by the TCG and 
described above, an isolated execution environment should 
provide the following services to hosted software [6]. 
• Protection from external interference. 
• Observation of the computations and data of a 
program running within an isolated environment 
only via controlled inter-process communication. 
• Secure communication between programs running 
in independent execution environments. 
• A trusted channel between an input/output device 
and a program running in an isolated environment. 
In order to provide software isolation and the services 
described, an isolation layer or virtual machine monitor can 
be deployed on the platform. Such a mechanism is not 
defined by the TCG. An isolation layer may be implemented 
using a number of approaches, as described below. Many of 
these approaches, however, have associated difficulties with 
respect to assurance, device support, legacy OS 
compatibility and performance. 
 
7.1. OS-Hosted Virtual Machine Monitor 
 
In the case of an OS-hosted virtual machine monitor, such as 
VMWare workstation, all guest OSs executing in VMs 
utilize the host OS device drivers. While this implies that 
every guest can utilize drivers developed for the host 
machine, it also means that the isolation layer essentially 
incorporates the VMM and the host OS, making assurance 
problematic [6, 13]. 
 
7.2. Standalone VMM 
 
In a standalone VMM, such as Terra [14], all devices are 
virtualized or emulated by the VMM. This means that the 
VMM must contain a virtual device driver for every 
supported device. As the set of devices in consumer systems 
is often large, and as many virtual drivers are complex, the 
size of the VMM quickly grows at the cost of assurance. 
A standalone VMM exposes the original hardware 
interface to its guests. While this implies that legacy OSs 
can be supported, it also means that the VMM size is 
increased due to the complexity involved in virtualizing the 
x86 CPU instruction set [6]. 
 
7.3. Para-Virtualization 
 
Isolation layers using para-virtualization techniques, such as 
XEN [15], have been designed for efficiency, and try to 
alleviate the complexity introduced when devices are 
virtualized. Two common approaches used in order to para-
virtualize I/O are as follows [13]. 
In the first case, an I/O-type-specific API for each 
device is integrated into the VMM, in conjunction with the 
device drivers [13]. This approach requires a guest OS to 
incorporate para-virtualized drivers which enable 
communication with the VMM APIs rather than the 
hardware device interfaces. While this gives performance 
gains over full virtualization, the guest OS must be modified 
to communicate with the I/O-type-specific APIs. 
Alternatively, a service OS, which incorporates the 
VMM APIs and the device drivers, may execute in parallel 
to guest OSs, which are modified to incorporate para-
virtualized drivers [13]. To enable this approach, devices are 
exported to the service OS.  While this approach means that 
device drivers do not have to be implemented within the 
isolation layer, the isolation layer may become open to 
attack from a guest in control of a direct memory access 
device which is, by default, given unrestricted access to the 
full physical address space of the machine. 
 
7.4. An Isolation Layer with Hardware Support 
 
The isolation layer described as part of the NGSCB [6, 16] 
was designed to take advantage of CPU and chipset 
extensions in the next generation of hardware.  Such 
extensions are being provided, for example, by Intel’s 
LaGrande [3]. The isolation kernel has been designed to 
execute in a CPU mode more privileged than the existing 
ring 0, effectively in ring -1, which will be introduced in 
forthcoming versions of the x86 processors. This enables the 
isolation layer to operate in ring -1 and all guest OSs to 
execute in ring 0. Thus, complexity problems which arise 
when virtualizing the x86 instruction set are avoided [6]. 
The original hardware interface is exposed to one guest 
OS [6]. However, rather than necessitating the virtualization 
of all devices, as a VMM does, devices are exported to guest 
OSs which contain drivers for the devices they choose to 
support. Guest operating systems may then efficiently 
operate directly on the chosen device. This does, however, 
leave the problem of uncontrolled Direct Memory Access 
(DMA) devices, which by default have access to all physical 
memory. In order to prevent DMA devices circumventing 
virtual memory-based protections provided by the isolation 
layer, it is necessary for the chipset manufacturers to provide 
chipset extensions. This enables a DMA policy to be set by 
the isolation layer which indicates, given the state of the 
system, if a particular subject (DMA device) has access 
(read or write) to a specified resource (physical address), 
[6]. The DMA policy is then read and enforced by hardware, 
for example the memory controller or bus bridges. 
Hardware extensions required in order to facilitate the 
implementation of the NGSCB isolation layer have been 
provided as part of Intel’s LaGrande [3] and AMD’s 
Presidio initiatives. Both enable the efficient and secure 
implementation of an isolation layer, as described by 
Microsoft, through the implementation of CPU and chipset 
extensions. Both also support the establishment of trusted 
channels between the input and output devices and programs 
running within an isolated environment. 
 
8. SOFTWARE DEFINED RADIO 
 
Software defined radio is an important innovation for the 
communications industry, providing many advantages over a 
wireless networking infrastructure and terminals that are 
implemented completely in hardware. Cost reductions may 
result from the deployment of a generic hardware platform 
which can be customized using software [17]. The value of 
terminals is increased as public/private sector radio system 
sharing becomes possible and as terminals can be upgraded 
to comply with evolving communications standards. In 
conjunction with this, SDR enables operation and 
maintenance cost reductions, as bug fixes may be completed 
by software download rather than terminal recall. 
Re-configurable radios can also be adapted to meet user 
and/or operator preferences. A terminal can also be 
reconfigured to efficiently cope with changing network 
conditions such as utilization, interference or radio channel 
quality, thereby offering an enhanced user experience [18]. 
Efficient roaming is also enabled, as air interface and 
frequency bands can be reconfigured as required. 
While there are many advantages associated with the 
introduction of SDR terminals, if SDR is to be accepted the 
security threats introduced by reconfigurable terminals must 
be analyzed, and measures taken to mitigate these threats. 
 
9. SDR THREAT ANALYSIS 
 
The threats which impact upon a reconfigurable SDR device 
may be categorized as follows: 
• Those which  impinge on the security of the 
downloaded reconfiguration software; and 
• Those which impinge on host security. 
The fundamental threat to the security of the 
downloaded reconfiguration software is: 
• Unauthorized reading of software while in transit 
between the software provider and the end host, or 
while in storage or executing on the end host. 
This threat may result in an infringement of the intellectual 
property rights associated with the software. It may also 
result in unauthorized access to and execution of software. 
Fundamental threats to end host security include: 
• Malicious or accidental modification or removal of 
security-critical software while in storage or 
executing on the end host. 
• The download of inappropriate reconfiguration 
software which does not meet the capability 
requirements of the SDR device. 
• Malicious or accidental modification, addition or 
removal of downloaded software in development, 
in transit or while in storage or executing on the 
end host. 
These threats may result in:  
• An inoperable device. For example, if a device uses 
software modulation, an improper change of the 
modulation format can render the individual device 
inoperable [19]. 
• Violation of Radio Frequency (RF) spectrum rights. 
This may, for example, result in RF interference. If 
a device can be programmed to transmit on a 
frequency for which it is not authorized, signals 
from other nodes, which are authorized to use this 
frequency, may be jammed [19]. Alternatively, 
spurious emissions resulting from unauthorized 
radio spectrum use could violate user safety [20]. 
• Increased output power. If a device, for example, 
operates at maximum power, its performance may 
be increased at the expense of other users in the 
communications network [19]. This in turn may 
force other users to use increased power. In this 
way, the device battery life is severely shortened. If 
the radiated power is too high, user safety may also 
be put at risk [20]. 
• Compromise of user applications and/or data by 
malicious software. 
The threats listed above, and the possible impacts of their 
exploitation, include those defined by the SDRF security 
working group in [21]. 
 
10. ADDRESSING THREATS TO SDR USING TC 
 
We now investigate some of ways in which trusted 
computing functionality may be used in order to address the 
threats outlined above or, failing that, to limit the level to 
which a threat may be exploited. 
 
10.1. Protecting the Reconfiguration Software 
 
TC mechanisms may be used to confidentiality-protect the 
reconfiguration software in transit between the software 
provider and the end host, while in storage or executing on 
the end host, and to ensure that only the intended recipient 
device can access the software. 
In [22], we describe a software download protocol 
which leveraged trusted computing functionality, or, more 
specifically, sealed storage, platform attestation, and 
isolation techniques. This protocol is now summarized. 
Before the required reconfiguration software can be 
downloaded to a TP, the TPM is used to generate an 
asymmetric key pair. This key pair is bound to a set of 
integrity metrics such that the private key can only be 
utilized by the TPM on which it was generated when the 
TPM host platform is in the specified state. The public key 
from this pair, and the integrity metrics with which its 
private key are associated, are then certified by the TPM 
using a TP AIK, described in section 5.2, so that the state to 
which the private key is bound can be shown to the software 
provider. The certified public key and the corresponding 
AIK credential are then sent to the software provider. 
On receipt of the certified key and the AIK credential, 
the software provider verifies the TP’s AIK credential and 
the signature of the TPM on the public key and the 
associated integrity metrics. If these two elements can be 
verified, and if the software provider considers the platform 
software state to which the key is bound to be trustworthy, 
the provider computes a MAC on and encrypts the 
reconfiguration software, encrypts the symmetric MACing 
and encryption keys using the public key received from the 
TP, signs the encrypted symmetric keys using his private 
signature key, and transmits this data to the TP. The 
symmetric keys received by the TP, and therefore the 
reconfiguration software, can only be accessed when the TP 
is in the state deemed trustworthy by the software provider. 
The software provider may require that the integrity 
metrics to which the private key is bound, represent an 
isolated execution environment executing on a specified 
isolation layer, which is turn is supported by a TP which 
incorporates hardware extensions that enable efficient and 
secure isolation, as described in section 7. In this way, the 
confidentiality of the reconfiguration software can be 
protected in transit between the software provider and the 
TP, in storage, and while executing on the device. The 
software provider is also assured that only a specified TP in 
a particular state can access the software.  
Alternatively, if a more traditional mechanism such as 
SSL/TLS is used in order to provide secure download of the 
reconfiguration software, TC functionality can be used in 
order to harden the SSL/TLS implementation. In this case, 
prior to the completion of any SSL/TLS protocol, the TPM 
is used in order to generate the client-side (the SDR device) 
asymmetric key pair for authentication, which is bound to a 
set of integrity metrics such that the private key can only be 
utilized by the TPM on which it was generated when the 
TPM host platform is in the required state. This key is then 
certified using a TP AIK. Evidence that this SSL/TLS key 
pair has been generated on, and certified by, a TPM is then 
provided by a Certification Authority (CA) in an extension 
of the SDR device’s X.509 SSL/TLS certificate.  
During an SSL/TLS protocol run between a software 
provider and the SDR device, the information provided in 
the extension of the SDR device’s X.509 SSL/TLS public 
key certificate enables a software provider to trust that the 
SDR device’s private SSL/TLS key is held within a TPM, 
and that the key can only be used when the platform is in a 
particular state. As above, the software provider may require 
that the integrity metrics to which the private key is bound, 
represent an isolated execution environment into which the 
software will be downloaded and executed. This hardened 
implementation of SSL/TLS gives the software provider 
some assurance that the SDR device’s SSL/TLS private key 
is stored securely and cannot been stolen. Evidence of the 
device’s ability to provide an isolated execution 
environment for the downloaded software can also be 
demonstrated. This process is described in [23]. The 
protocol described in [22] has the advantage that less 
processing is required on the potentially resource-
constrained SDR device in order to complete the download.  
 
10.2. Protecting the Host 
 
10.2.1. Security-Critical Software 
 
While the integrity of security-critical software while in 
storage cannot be ensured using TC functionality, TC 
mechanisms may be utilized to help detect its malicious or 
accidental modification or removal.  
A secure boot process can be used to ensure that a set of 
security-critical platform components boot into the required 
state. Secure boot is not currently enabled by the TCG TPM 
main specifications. However, much work on secure boot 
has been conducted independently of the TCG, including by 
Tygar and Yee [24], Clark [25], Arbaugh, Farber and Smith 
[26] and Itoi and Arbaugh [27]. Each of these papers 
describe a similar process, in which the integrity of a pre-
defined set of system components is measured, as described 
in section 3.1, and these measurements then compared 
against a set of expected measurements which must be 
securely stored and accessed by the platform during the boot 
process. If, at any stage during the boot process, the removal 
or modification of a platform component is detected, the 
boot process is aborted. While a secure boot process is not 
specified in the TPM specification set, the TCG mobile 
phone working group has recently released a specification 
for a Mobile TPM which enables a secure boot process [28]. 
TC functionality also enables the isolation of security-
critical software in a secure execution environment so that it 
cannot be observed or modified when executing by software 
executing in parallel insecure execution environment. 
 
10.2.2. Reconfiguration (Radio) Software 
 
A capability exchange must be completed by the network 
and the SDR prior to software download to ensure that the 
appropriate software entities and parameter sets are selected 
for a particular SDR device, [29]. The use of platform 
attestation, as described in section 3.2, could be used to 
ensure that the reports sent by the device are accurate. 
TC cannot prevent denial of service attacks resulting 
from the removal/deletion of the downloaded radio software, 
either in development, or in transit between the software 
provider and the host or in storage on the host. While TC 
functionality cannot prevent the malicious or accidental 
modification or addition of downloaded software in 
development or in transit, in the advent of malicious or 
buggy software being downloaded to and executed on a 
device, there are a number of ways in which TC can lessen 
the impact of the exploitation of this threat. 
If the downloaded software is isolated in its own 
execution environment, as described in section 7, then any 
malicious behavior can be controlled and its effects limited. 
If sealed storage is utilized by the end user to protect 
their private data (e.g., credit card numbers), then the impact 
of malicious software may be lessened, as it cannot gain 
access to security sensitive data which has been protected. 
On reconnection to a commercial network, a trusted 
SDR device could be required to attest to its state so that a 
decision can be made as to whether the device should be 
authorized to access the network. Building upon basic 
attestation, as described in section 3.2, the specifications of 
the TCG Trusted Network Connect work group describe a 
process which may be completed in order to ensure that 
devices connecting to a network are in a trustworthy state.  
This 3-stage process involves: 
• Assessment (is the platform in a trustworthy state?); 
• Isolation (of the device if its state is not considered 
trustworthy by the network); and  
• Remediation (where the state of the device can be 
updated/modified as required) [30]. 
Process isolation may be utilized in order to ensure that 
the downloaded radio software can execute unhindered. 
 
11. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper we have introduced the concept of trusted 
computing. Following a brief overview of the threats 
introduced by the deployment of re-configurable terminals 
we highlighted some of ways in which TC functionality may 
be used in order to mitigate, or lessen the impact of, these 
threats. While trusted computing is not a panacea to the 
plethora of security threats pertaining to the secure 
download and execution of reconfiguration software, it 
enables us to address a significant number of them, either 
through threat mitigation or through threat impact reduction. 
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